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ABSTRACT
According to  classical portfolio theory, two implications follow when an asset has a 
positive alpha against some benchmark: (1) the benchm ark is mean-variance inefficient; 
(2) by combining the positive alpha asset with the benchmark, one can improve the mean- 
variance efficiency of the benchmark. The first implication is well known, but the second 
is largely ignored in the existing literature. This dissertation tests and applies the second 
implication. The dissertation has two chapters.
C hap ter 1 empirically tests the theory. Specifically, we test w hether the alpha of 
an investment relative to  one’s existing portfolio can be used to  improve out-of-sample 
performance as m easured by Sharpe ratio  and four-factor alpha. For the period 2000 - 
2014, we confirm this for the Vanguard S&P 500 Index Fund and the Growth and Small 
Index Fund, which we extend by adding various Exchange Traded Funds.
C hapter 2 applies the theory in the m utual fund context in order to  shed light on the re­
lation between active m anagement and fund performance. Recent studies have documented 
a positive relation between the degree of active m anagement and m utual fund performance. 
We show th a t this relation holds only for fund managers who trade  in an optim al way. 
The optim ality m easure th a t we develop, “investment alpha,” captures whether a m utual 
fund is trad ing  towards mean-variance optimality, which, we argue, is the first-best choice 
for m utual fund m anagers w ithin a mean-variance framework. This investment alpha is 
similar to  previous work using evaluation alphas such as Jensen’s alpha, except th a t our 
benchm ark is the m anager’s own portfolio. We show th a t if the investment alpha of a 
fund’s incremental portfolio — defined as the portfolio obtained by collecting the changes 
in a m anager’s positions over a given period — is positive then  the fund is trading in the 
“right” direction. We show empirically th a t managers who do so outperform , and the more 
so if they are more active, and th a t investors react to  the correct direction through increases 
in fund flows in the subsequent quarter. Actively m anaged funds th a t don’t trade  toward 
mean-variance optim ality do not outperform .
For my mom
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CHAPTER 1
USING ALPHA TO GENERATE ALPHA  
1.1 Introduction
I t has long been known (e.g., Blume (1984), Dybvig and Ross (1985a)) th a t, in principle, 
alpha can be used to  improve the Sharpe ratio  of one’s portfolio. All one has to  do is to 
marginally change portfolio weights of individual holdings in proportion to their alphas. 
Im portantly, the alphas should be com puted w ith one’s own portfolio as benchmark, and 
not some other, a rb itrary  benchmark. W hile the approach is m athem atically correct, it is 
not obvious th a t it will work in practice (although we discuss related work below). To our 
knowledge, there is no system atic evidence on whether the technique produces economically 
significant results. This is w hat we set out to  test.
There are a num ber of reasons why adjusting weights in proportion to  alphas may 
not work in practice. E stim ation error imm ediately comes to  mind: alphas are, after all, 
estim ated, and the resulting sampling error may destroy the improvement in the Sharpe 
ratio  th a t one could obtain if one had known the true  alphas. B ut perhaps the most 
im portant reason is th a t expected returns change over tim e (e.g., Conrad and Kaul (1988)). 
By the tim e alphas are estim ated accurately, expected returns have moved, to  the extent 
th a t the obtained alphas are no longer relevant. One is effectively chasing a moving target 
(Garleanu and Pedersen, 2013).
A particularly interesting case to  consider, we think, is where an investor holds a broadly 
diversified index initially, i.e., some proxy of the m arket portfolio, and then  tries to  improve 
the mean-variance efficiency of the held index. T ha t is what we report on here. We shall 
refer to  the improved portfolio th a t the investor obtains after adjusting weights in proportion 
to  alphas as the alpha adjusted index. We th ink th a t our case is interesting because of two 
reasons: (i) we know th a t broad indices generally are not mean-variance optim al, so th a t 
alphas of individual securities are indeed nonzero; (ii) when one takes the index as a proxy of 
the m arket portfolio, the emergence of nonzero alphas implies th a t the csapital asset pricing 
model (CAPM ) fails. If, however, m arkets constantly move in the direction o f  CAPM, then 
the alpha adjustm ent strategy may fail after all. Indeed, prices adjust to  ensure th a t alphas 
converge to  zero (this is what it means for m arkets to  move in the direction of CAPM ).
Hence, the index one started  from becomes mean-variance optim al, while the alpha adjusted 
index becomes mean-variance suboptim al. As such, one should have remained invested in 
the index, ra ther th an  adjusting its weights.
The la tte r rem ark suggests th a t this study could be viewed as a test of whether markets 
move towards CAPM. It is well known th a t CAPM  fails empirically (see Fam a and French
(1992)), but trad itional tests assume th a t one always observes prices when the m arket is in 
equilibrium. Common sense instead suggests th a t m arkets take a long tim e to  equilibrate, 
and chances are slim th a t observations always coincide w ith equilibrium. Experim ental 
evidence confirms this: even if traditional CAPM  tests may fail, m arkets do have a strong 
tendency to  move towards CAPM  (Bossaerts and P lo tt (2004), Asparouhova et al. (2003)). 
O f course, real-world financial m arkets are more complex th an  laboratory m arkets, en­
counter far more friction, and participants know much less than  in a controlled setting (e.g., 
they do not know the true  distribution of future payoffs). So, additional forces may be at 
work which the stylized setting of the laboratory ignores. If we find th a t our alpha adjusted 
index does not improve the mean-variance efficiency of our index, one possible cause is th a t 
prices adjust in the direction of CAPM . Indeed, in th a t case, it is beneficial to  stick to 
the original index, even if, based on prior retu rn  d a ta  alone, the index is inefficient (i.e., 
there exist nonzero alphas). One effectively lets the m arkets do the adjustm ents towards 
mean-variance optimality.
One way to  gauge the economic significance of our exercise is to  appeal to  a result 
in Dybvig and Ross (1985a). There, it is shown th a t, to  generate a positive alpha with 
respect to  any (necessarily mean-variance suboptim al) benchm ark or collection of bench­
marks, it suffices to  acquire a mean-variance optim al portfolio. Admittedly, our investment 
strategy does not guarantee full mean-variance optimality. At best, the strategy improves 
efficiency. Still, one can pose the following question: will improvement in mean-variance 
efficiency be sufficient to  generate a (significantly) positive alpha w ith respect to  benchmarks 
traditionally  used in the academic literature? The benchmarks we have in mind are the 
Fam a-French-Carhart four-factor portfolios (C arhart (1997)). T ha t is, we test whether 
the alpha adjusted portfolio is capable of generating positive alpha w ith respect to  the 
traditional Fam a-French-Carhart factor portfolios.
P u ttin g  everything together, evidence th a t the alpha adjusted portfolio generates pos­
itive alpha w ith respect to  the Fam a-French-Carhart model would not only dem onstrate 
th a t our technique is economically relevant. It would also vindicate the claim in Dybvig 
and Ross (1985a). At the same time, it would dem onstrate th a t m arkets do not move to
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CAPM , or th a t m arkets move towards CAPM  sufficiently slow for there to  be exploitable 
mean-variance inefficiencies. This is exactly w hat we find.
To ensure th a t our strategy would work in practice, we do not use an academic index as 
benchm ark (e.g., the CRSP index), but instead focus on investable indices, namely, two of 
V anguard’s E T F  (Exchange Traded Fund) indices. In addition, we use a num ber of ETFs 
as candidate extensions of those indices. As such, our results are not only aimed at an 
academic audience, bu t should be of interest to  practitioners as well.
Concurrent w ith our analysis, Levy and Roll (2015) have investigated alpha-based stra te ­
gies for portfolio improvement. There are a num ber of key differences between their and our 
investigations. F irst, Levy and Roll (2015) determ ine whether weights on component stocks 
of an index can be changed in order to  improve performance, while we focus on additions 
of various types of E T Fs to  a given index. There are two differences, as a result: (i) 
we look at extending the index, while Levy and Roll (2015) investigate changing weights; 
(ii) we consider diversified ETFs rather th an  individual stock. The la tte r is im portant 
because alphas of individual stock cannot be estim ated precisely, while those of ETFs, 
because of their lower volatility, are far more precise. Second, Levy and Roll (2015) aim at 
improving in-sample performance: alphas are estim ated over a ten-year period, new weights 
are com puted based on those alphas, and Sharpe ratio  improvements, over the same ten-year 
period, are recorded. Instead, the analysis in this study is entirely out-of-sample: we use 
alphas th a t are estim ated over the prior sixty-m onth period in order to  determ ine weights to 
be applied over the subsequent month; we then  move our sixty-m onth estim ation window 
and determ ine weights for the next month. Third, Levy and Roll (2015) study to  what 
extent alpha-based adjustm ent can provide a globally optim al portfolio, while we are only 
interested in m arginal improvement. M athematically, alpha-based adjustm ent is m eant only 
for marginal improvements, and then only when alphas are relatively stable over tim e. Levy 
and Roll (2015) find th a t, for the purpose of finding globally optim al portfolios, alpha-based 
adjustm ent does not work.1
If our procedure works, then  the following academic exercise makes sense. Assume th a t 
investors are interested in improving the mean-variance efficiency of their portfolio. In th a t 
case, observed asset flows should correlate with alpha. If an asset has a positive alpha, then 
investors increase exposure, while if an asset has a negative alpha, then  investors decrease
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1In the spirit of Newtonian hill climbing, one should reestim ate alphas and redeterm ine weights after 
each m arginal adjustm ent, to  eventually end up w ith the optim al portfolio. Instead, Levy and Roll (2015) 
merely scale the adjustm ents, conjecturing th a t alphas do not need to  be reestimated.
exposure. We don’t know which portfolio investors use as benchmark, however. Is it some 
m arket proxy? Or the Fam a-French factor portfolios? One can infer the benchm ark from 
the asset flows: the benchm ark should be such th a t it generates positive alphas for assets 
toward which investors move, while it ought to  generate negative alphas for assets from 
which investors retreat. Implications of such an exercise are discussed in Berk and van 
Binsbergen (2016) and B arber et al. (2014). The approach makes sense only if investors 
believe th a t alpha improves mean-variance efficiency. Our results suggest th a t such beliefs 
are w arranted.
The rem ainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes empirical 
methodology. We present main results in section 1.3, and discuss the results in section 1.4. 
Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Methods
We assume the investor s tarts  from a benchm ark index fund. Each period, she is 
considering several additions. So, each period, our investor is deciding how much to 
allocate to  her benchm ark index fund, and to  alternative assets. W hether to  invest in 
these alternatives will depend on their alphas, as estim ated over a finite past history, with 
the index fund as benchmark. If alpha is estim ated to  be positive, the corresponding asset 
is added to  the index; if the estim ated alpha is negative, the corresponding asset is shorted 
(if the asset is part of the index, this effectively means th a t its weight is reduced). As 
m entioned before, the resulting portfolio will be referred to  as alpha adjusted index.
As benchmarks, we use various equity index funds, such as the Vanguard S&P 500. We 
consider Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) as potential additional investments. Our choices 
ensure tradability. Indeed, funds such as the Vanguard S&P 500 are probably among 
the most widely used index vehicles in the marketplace, as they are available for a low 
m anagement fee, and because of their liquidity, involve less trad ing  costs. We here follow a 
recent trend in the academic literature (e.g., Berk and van Binsbergen (2016)) to  substitu te 
tradeable funds for the previously more popular, but academic, factor portfolios such as 
the Fama-French factors. Nevertheless, we will evaluate performance of our alpha adjusted 
index w ith respect to  these academic portfolios.
There is another, no less crucial reason why we use ETFs. In contrast to  individual 
stock, their volatility is usually much lower, and hence, alphas are estim ated w ith more 
precision.
As benchm ark indices, we used the Vanguard S&P500 Index Fund (VFINX) and Van­
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5guard Growth and Small Index Fund (VISGX). ETFs d a ta  are from the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) M onthly Stock File. They carry Share Code 73. We applied filters 
to  ensure ETFs to  be tradable and to  be liquid. We requrie the ETFs to  have average daily 
dollar volume exceeds 1 million. E T F  must have at least 72 m onthly observations to  be 
included. We s ta rt our sampling in January  2000 and stops a t December 2014.2
To determ ine the alpha adjusted index for a particular m onth t, we ran a tim e series 
regression over the prior sixty months, w ith the excess retu rn  on a candidate investment 
(ETF) as dependent variable, and the excess return  of the benchm ark index as independent 
variable. We require the E T F  to  have at least 24 months return  observations over the 
estim ation period. Excess returns are com puted relative to  the one-m onth Treasury Bill 
R ate. The intercept of this regressions for E T F  i, denoted alpha a i;t, is used subsequently 
to  determ ine the E T F ’s weight x i)t in the alpha adjusted portfolio, as follows:
where I t denotes the m onth-t retu rn  on the index, and E i;t is the m onth-t return  on E T F  i.
fact, as we will dem onstrate, estim ated alphas were quite persistent, so th a t m onthly weight 
adjustm ents were minimal, and hence, trading costs should be reasonable.
We used the following performance measures. F irst, we looked at the cumulative wealth 
over the investment period from January  2005 to  December 2014 and compared it to  th a t 
of buying and holding the benchm ark index. This does not correct for risk, and hence, the 
results are relevant only for a risk-neutral investor. Second, we com puted Sharpe ratios, 
which are relevant for someone with quadratic (or mean-variance) preferences. Third, we 
estim ated alphas of our alpha adjusted indices w ith respect to  the Fam a-French-Carhart 
four-factor benchmark. This is relevant for the academic community, which traditionally  
uses the four-factor model to  determ ine abnorm al performance of an investment strategy.
Significance of improvements in Sharpe ratio  relative to  buying and holding the bench­
m ark indices is determ ined using boo tstrap  estim ation of the empirical distribution of
(1.1)
As a result, the m onth-t return  on the alpha adjusted index equals:
(1.2)
In principle, our alpha-adjustm ent would need plenty of rebalancing each month. In
2E T Fs only s ta rted  to get popular around 2000, at which point the CRSP dataset reported on 31 funds. 
Given th a t we need 60 m onths to estim ate alpha, this implies th a t the first retu rn  observation for our alpha 
adjusted index is for January of 2005.
6Sharpe ratios. There, we random ly (with replacement) drew weight vectors [xi,t, i = 1,..., N ] 
from our histories of estim ated weights, random ly perm uting vector elements in order 
to  avoid hindsight bias.3 Significance of alphas relative to  the Fama-French four-factor 
benchm ark is determ ined by standard  tim e series z-statistics.
1.3 Results
Figure 1.1 plots the evolution of wealth from the beginning of our exercise (January  2005) 
to  the end (December 2014). For both  benchm ark indices, wealth (blue line) increases at 
a much faster pace th an  when merely buying and holding the benchm ark index (red line). 
This increase does come at the cost of additional volatility, bu t the average return  more 
th an  compensates: the Sharpe ratios (at 0.23 and 0.22, respectively) are substantially higher 
th an  those for the benchm ark indices (0.12 and 0.14).
Figure 1.2 displays the empirical d istribution of the bootstrapped (10,000 times) Sharpe 
ratios based on random  drawing and scrambling of weight vectors. In both  cases, the Sharpe 
ratios of the alpha adjusted benchmarks are comfortably above the 99th percentile of the 
empirical distribution, suggesting th a t they are significant at the 1% level. Alpha adjusted 
VFINX m onthly Sharpe ratio  is 0.226; B ootstrapped m onthly Sharpe ratio  a t top  1% level 
is 0.194. Alpha adjusted VISGX m onthly Sharpe ratio  is 0.245; B ootstrapped Sharpe ratio 
a t top 1% level is 0.176.
Table 1.1 presents tim e series regressions of excess returns on the VFINX index and the 
alpha adjusted VFINX index onto the Fam a-French-Carhart four factors (m arket factor, 
size factor, value factor, and m om entum  factor). The intercept, i.e., the four-factor alpha, 
is significantly negative for the index, and is 84 basis points per month, significantly positive 
(p < 0.01) for our alpha adjusted index. Alpha adjustm ent therefore increases alpha by a 
sigificant 87 basis points as shown in column 3 of Table 1.1.
Table 1.2 replicates the previous table for the VISGX index. The four-factor alpha is 
insignificant for the index (2 basis points per m onth), and is significantly positive for alpha 
adjusted strategy (p < 0.05). Alpha adjustm ent increases alpha by 79 basis points.
1.4 Discussion
Alpha adjustm ent using a selection of E T Fs appears to  have significant effects on 
the performance of the VFINX and VISGX indices. Final wealth increases dram atically,
3W hen the t th  weight vector is drawn and applied to  adjust the benchm ark index for period t -  t , where 
t  = 1,..., 60, spurious increases in the Sharpe ratio  emerge because the t th  weight vector is based on estim ates 
of alphas over the sixty m onths prior to  t.
Sharpe ratios rise significantly and Fam a-French-Carhart four-factor alphas are significantly 
positive. The economic m agnitudes of the improvements are substantial: Sharpe ratios 
double or increase by one th ird , respectively; alphas increase on a m onthly basis by 87 basis 
points and 66 basis points, respectively.
Behind our “alpha adjustm ent” is the idea th a t an investm ent’s alpha relative to  one’s 
base holdings provides an indication of whether the investment is worth adding to  one’s 
portfolio (positive alpha) or worth shorting (negative alpha). Alphas for candidate invest­
ments are generally not com puted for an individual’s own base holdings, bu t for standard  
benchmarks. W hen the standard  benchmarks are closely related to  the individual’s own base 
holdings, the la tte r alphas may still provide a good indication on how to  invest. To determ ine 
whether this is the case for our benchmarks, the VFINX and VISGX, we replicated our 
alpha adjustm ent procedure, bu t used Fam a-French-Carhart four-factor alphas instead of 
alphas relative to  VFINX and VISGX. As expected, the improvements were not as good, 
bu t nevertheless quite satisfactory see Figure 1.1).
In our exercise, we decided each m onth w hether to  invest in, or short, an E T F  based on 
th a t E T F ’s alpha with respect to  the benchm ark index (VFINX or VISGX), as estim ated 
over the past 60 months. It is im portant to  note th a t we did not decide based on an E T F ’s 
alpha w ith respect to  the alpha adjusted index from the prior month. This could have 
been a plausible alternative, whereby one adjusts each m onth the alpha adjusted index, but 
the alternative approach estim ates alphas for a portfolio whose weights in the ETFs are 
noisy because these weights are based on estim ated alphas. As a result, errors in estim ating 
alphas are compounded. Not surprisingly, when we implemented the alternative approach, 
outperform ance of the alpha adjusted index disappeared entirely.
I t is worth investigating to  w hat extent the weights on the E T F  investments in our alpha 
adjusted index change over tim e. If these weights change too much, then the outperform ance 
may be lost in transaction costs. Closer inspection of the evolution of weights suggests, 
however, th a t they change only little from one m onth to  another, and hence, th a t adjustm ent 
to  the alpha adjusted portfolio are minimal. Figure 1.3 plots the evolution of weights for 
our two indices. This figure dem onstrates th a t the weights are persistent over time.
Altogether, our findings confirm the practical validity of the alpha-based performance 
improvement technique advocated in Blume (1984) and Dybvig and Ross (1985a). Specifi­
cally, alphas are sufficiently stable over tim e for extensions of one’s portfolio based on these 
alphas to  lead to  better out-of-sample performance (Sharpe ratios; Fama-French Four-Factor 
alphas).
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At the same time, if the benchmarks we used can be considered proxies of the market 
portfolio, our findings discredit the CAPM  or, a t a minimum, prices do not adjust fast 
enough to  elim inate alpha w ithin our investment horizon, which was one m onth. If CAPM  
had consistently obtained w ithin a m onth, we should not have been able to  use alphas 
estim ated from prior m onths and generate outperform ance.
Of course, it could be th a t CAPM  does hold but our benchmarks are bad proxies for 
the m arket. It would be interesting to  investigate more closely the weights on individual 
investments of our alpha adjusted portfolio. Since performance did improve, since only the 
m arket portfolio (together w ith a risk free security) is optim al under CAPM , and since the 
m arket portfolio weighs all individual investments positively (Green (1986)), the signs of 
the weights in our alpha adjusted portfolio should be positive. We leave such an exercise 
for future investigation.
1.5 Conclusion
Because of our findings, we advocate the use of alpha to  obtain m arginal out-of-sample 
improvements to  one’s investments. Im portantly, alpha is to  be measured w ith respect to 
one’s own benchmark, and not to  someone else’s investments, or to  a set of portfolios of 
interest to  academics (e.g., the Fam a-French-Carhart factor portfolios).
8
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F ig u re  1.1: W ealth growth of alpha-adjusted strategy 
Red solid lines: evolution of wealth invested in the alpha adjusted index (top: VFINX; 
bottom : VISGX), starting  from one dollar; alpha adjustm ent is based on alphas estim ated 
against VFINX (top) or VISGX (bottom ). Blue dashed lines: evolution of wealth invested 
in the alpha adjusted index (top: VFINX; bottom : VISGX), starting  from one dollar; 
alpha adjustm ent is based on Fama-French Four-Factor alphas, and not alpha relative to 
the indices. Purple dotted  line: evolution of wealth invested in the index (top: VFINX; 
bottom : VISGX), starting  from one dollar.
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F ig u re  1.2: Histograms of bootstrapped Sharpe ratios
11
F ig u re  1.3: Evolution of portfolio weights for alpha-adjusted strategy
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intercept -0.0003* 0.0084** 0.0087** 0.0057 0.0060*
(0.0002) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0036)
m ktrf 0.9987*** 1.8950*** 0.8962*** 1.7280*** 0.7292***
(0.0047) (0.1084) (0.1085) (0.0979) (0.0976)
smb -0.1469*** -0.3571* - 0.2101 -0.3269* -0.1799
(0.0083) (0.1930) (0.1931) (0.1743) (0.1737)
hml 0.0226*** -0.0705 -0.0931 -0.2363 -0.2589
(0.0079) (0.1829) (0.1830) (0.1651) (0.1646)
umd - 0.0012 0.1245 0.1256 0.0952 0.0963
(0.0039) (0.0915) (0.0915) (0.0826) (0.0823)
Observations 120 120 120 120 120
Adjusted R 2 0.9981 0.7609 0.3870 0.7601 0.3270





























































Observations 120 120 120 120 120
Adjusted R 2 0.9749 0.7607 0.1200 0.8013 0.3270
CHAPTER 2
INVESTM ENT DIRECTION AND ACTIVE 
MANAGEMENT  
2.1 Introduction
Despite the increasing popularity of index funds, the m ajority  of delegated money is still 
actively m anaged.1 W ith  the rapid growth and increased com petition in the m utual fund 
industry, it is getting more difficult for active m utual funds to  identify profitable trading 
opportunities (Pastor and Stam baugh (2012)). In order to  generate superior performance 
relative to  passive benchmarks, m utual funds have to  be active. A lthough being active 
might be necessary for superior performance, it is not sufficient. To obtain abnorm al 
performance, funds need to  be both  active and trading in a direction th a t allows them  
to  outperform  relevant benchmarks. In this study, we show th a t the interaction effect 
between activeness and direction (as we define below) is critical for fund performance. This 
conjecture might seem obvious, but as we will show, previous literature has focused solely 
on the activeness-performance relation. We dem onstrate empirically (i) th a t funds trading 
in the right direction are able to  outperform  those who do not, (ii) th a t active management 
is more effective in generating superior performance when the trad ing  direction is correct, 
and (iii) th a t money flows into m utual funds th a t trade in the correct direction.
In contrast to  the traditional wisdom (e.g., Jensen (1968) and Fam a and French (2010)), 
a growing literature shows th a t active m anagement is good for performance. Cremers 
and Petajisto  (2009) propose a holdings-based measure of activeness for m utual funds: 
active share. Active share captures how much a fund’s holdings deviate from the fund’s 
benchm ark’s portfolio weights.2 The authors show th a t high active share implies better 
performance as m easured by four-factor alphas of the fund’s benchm ark-adjusted return. 
Amihud and Goyenko (2013) propose a return-based (as opposed to  holdings-based) measure
xThe 2015 report from Investm ent Company Institu te  shows th a t the share of the index equity m utual 
funds is about 20% of equity funds in term s of to ta l net assets.
2 Formally, active share is defined as half of the M anhattan  D istance between a m utual funds holdings 
weights vector and its benchm arks holdings weights vector.
of active management: selectivity. The idea is to  m easure how close a funds return  
are tracking the returns of common factors from a four-factor model (Fama and French
(1993), C arhart (1997)).3 The results support the claim th a t funds with high selectivity 
outperform  those with low selectivity, in term s of four-factor alpha. Analogous to  Cremers 
and P etajisto  (2009), the dissimilarity of a fund with a common benchm ark determines 
fund performance. Another more conventional m easure of active m anagem ent is turnover 
ratio. Existing evidence on the relation between turnover ratio  and fund performance is 
conflicting. E lton et al. (1993) and C arhart (1997) find turnover is negatively correlated 
with fund performance. Chen et al. (2000) and D ahlquist et al. (2000) find a positive 
relation. However, all these studies focus on cross-sectional variation. In a recent new 
paper, P asto r et al. (2015a) docum ent a clear positive relation between turnover ratio 
and fund performance. Their results are derived from a careful exam ination of time-series 
variation w ithin fund.
However, controversy remains. A priori, it is not clear why active m anagement such as 
more intense trading or trading away from a benchm ark may generate superior performance. 
For example, if the level of activeness is orthogonal to  a trad ing  direction th a t generates 
higher returns4, then more active m anagement could potentially harm  fund perform ance.5 
We argue th a t the direction towards which funds are trad ing  needs to  be considered as well. 
Then the natural question is: what is the correct direction?
M easuring direction empirically is more difficult as no readily available proxies exist. To 
s ta rt thinking about the correct investment direction, we need specify the first best portfolio 
th a t fund managers would hold in an ideal situation th a t maximizes their wealth or utility 
from wealth. We argue such first best portfolio should be mean-variance optim al for two 
main reasons.
F irst, a mean-variance optim al portfolio guarantees positive evaluation alphas estim ated 
using any benchmark, provided th a t the benchmarks are mean-variance inefficient. M utual
14
3Selectivity is defined as one minus the R-squared estim ated from the four-factor model. Thus, a low 
R-squared for a fund means high selectivity.
4Indeed, we find our measure of correctness of direction has correlations close to  0 w ith measures of 
activeness.
5In a white paper Frazzini et al. (2015) present an analogous critique on active share. They argue there 
is no obvious theoretical foundation why active share can predict fund performance. They suggest th a t 
better performance of high active share funds is instead driven by benchm ark performance. B oth authors 
of Cremers and P eta jisto  (2009) have w ritten  responses. Here, our focus is not on the veracity of prior 
evidence. Instead, we try  to offer perspective.
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fund performance is often captured by some form of “alpha” (abnorm al performance), 
which is usually estim ated by certain benchmarks. We shall refer all types of abnorm al 
returns used in fund performance evaluation as evaluation alpha, to  highlight th a t the 
purpose of such alphas is performance evaluation. However, w ith the development of asset 
pricing theory, there is now a rich set of benchm ark alternatives can be used to  estim ate 
evaluation alphas.6 Thus, managers face ambiguity about the benchm ark against which she 
will be evaluated. The mean-variance optim al portfolio becomes the ideal holding because 
it guarantees positive evaluation alpha against any (mean-variance suboptim al) benchmark. 
It has long been understood th a t the benchmarks used to  estim ate evaluation alphas must 
not be mean-variance efficient ex post because otherwise no evaluation alphas would be 
nonzero: Roll (1977) proved th a t evaluation alphas should be exactly zero if an ex post 
mean-variance efficient portfolio is used as benchm ark.7 Dybvig and Ross (1985), however, 
prove th a t a m anager can guarantee a positive evaluation alpha by choosing a mean-variance 
efficient portfolio.
Second, fund m anagers’ incentives are aligned w ith evaluation alphas. Fund managers 
prefer to  manage large funds because their com pensation is a fixed percentage of to tal 
assets under m anagement. Thus, fund m anagers want to  a ttrac t as much capital inflow as 
possible. So far, the m utual fund literature shows th a t the most im portant driving factor 
for fund flow is past performance, captured by some form of evaluation alpha .8 Holding 
a mean-variance optim al portfolio yields positive evaluation alpha of any form, and thus 
a ttrac ts  capital inflows. One may argue th a t the fund m anager’s com pensation does not 
entirely depend on fees they charge. Some managers are com pensated by bonus for beating 
a specified benchmark. However, this argum ent does not invalidate our claim th a t the 
first best portfolio choice for fund managers is mean-variance optim al portfolio because a 
mean-variance optim al portfolio will beat any (inefficient) benchmark.
Given th a t the surest portfolio for a fund m anager is a mean-variance optim al portfolio, 
w hat a fund m anager ought to  do is to  trade towards mean-variance efficiency; this way,
6For example, Jensen’s alpha uses a proxy of m arket portfolio as benchmark, the Fama-French three- 
factor alpha is based on a m arket factor, a size factor, and a value factor, the Fam a-French-Carhart alpha 
uses a m om entum  factor in addition to  the three factors, and M orningstar ratings are based on an index 
fund th a t differs across fund categories (as defined by M orningstar itself). In a recent paper, Berk and van 
Binsbergen (2016) listed fifteen alternative benchmarks w ith which to  determ ine fund abnorm al performance.
7In this sense, the evaluation alpha actually reveals more about the mean-variance efficiency of the 
benchmark, ra ther th an  the portfolio being evaluated.
8see Berk and van Binsbergen (2016), Lynch and M usto (2003), and Chevalier and Ellison (1997).
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she will a t least ensure positive outperform ance (i.e., positive evaluation alpha) no m atter 
w hat benchm ark she will be evaluated against. As such, the correct trad ing  direction of a 
m utual fund is towards mean-variance optimality.
B ut it is difficult to  find mean-variance optim al portfolios directly. Instead of try ing to 
find mean-variance efficient portfolio directly, managers could take a step-wise approach, 
improving their portfolio’s mean-variance trade-off incrementally. If so, the portfolio theory 
of Dybvig and Ross (1985a) and Blume (1984)(henceforth Dybvig-Ross-Blume) becomes 
relevant. The theory suggests th a t, when a m anager is considering to  buy or sell a stock, 
she should estim ate the “alpha” of th a t stock using her current holdings as benchmark, 
and not some external benchm ark such as the S&P500 index. The m anager should then 
buy more of (or sell some of) stock w ith positive (negative) “alpha” relative to  her current 
holdings. This will pu t her in the direction towards mean-variance optimality. We shall 
refer to  the alpha estim ated against one’s own portfolio as benchm ark as the “investment 
alpha,” to  highlight its purpose as investment guide, and to  distinguish from the evaluation 
alpha.
There are two im portant differences between investment alpha and evaluation alpha. 
F irst, unlike evaluation alpha, investment alpha is estim ated using a m anager’s own portfolio 
as benchm ark instead of some external benchm ark(s). Among others, investment alpha, 
therefore, does not presuppose some equilibrium asset pricing model. Evaluation alpha 
requires one to  specify an equilibrium asset pricing model in order for it to  properly adjust 
for risk (therefore, the alpha is often referred as “risk adjusted abnorm al re tu rn”). Second, 
investment alpha provides clear investment guidance on whether to  buy or sell a given 
asset (or portfolio) marginally, while evaluation alpha cannot offer such guidance unless the 
m anager’s own holdings coincide with the benchm ark portfolio used to  estim ate evaluation 
alpha.9 It is tem pting to  th ink th a t if the benchm ark used to  estim ate the evaluation 
alpha is highly correlated with the investor’s holdings, then the evaluation alpha would be 
helpful for investors to  make investment decisions. This is the typical counter argum ent for 
Roll’s Critique. However, as Roll (1978) points out, even if the common benchmarks used to 
estim ate evaluation alpha and the investor’s holdings are highly correlated, alphas estim ated 
using them  may differ a lot from each other. Thus, evaluation alpha can’t replace investment 
alpha even if it is generated from a benchm ark th a t is highly correlated with investor own
9In their footnote 1, Fam a and French (2010) cite Dybvig and Ross (1985) to  justify why four-factor 
alpha can be used to  judge good or bad performance. However, investors generally do not hold a com bination 
of their four-factor portfolios, let alone the optim al combination. Here, we apply the theory from Dybvig 
and Ross (1985a) in a broader way, w ithout assuming th a t managers hold a particular portfolio.
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portfolio. Recently Bossaerts and Yang (2015) dem onstrate th a t an ex-ante trading strategy 
based on investment alpha can significantly improve the performance of a passive index 
fund and produce significantly positive evaluation alpha (Fam a-French-Carhart four-factor 
alpha, in this case). Additionally, they show th a t when using the four-factor alpha to  make 
adjustm ents, the improvements are less significant th an  when investment alpha is used.
Applying the concept of investment alpha to  the m utual fund context, we can empirically 
m easure if m anagers trade  towards mean-variance optimality. We use m utual fund holdings 
changes to  infer m anagers’ investment decisions. Specifically, we focus on the incremental 
portfolio, the portfolio consisting of all changes in positions over a given period. We then 
estim ate the investment alpha of the incremental portfolio using the fund’s prior holdings 
as benchmark, and use this alpha as our m easure of direction. Funds th a t have higher 
investment alphas for their incremental portfolio are the ones th a t invested in the correct 
direction. Since investment alphas are estim ated w ith error, we use its t-statistic , ta , as 
error-adjusted m easure of the direction in which managers moved their portfolios. We do not 
claim th a t managers who trade  in the right direction are deliberately applying the Dybvig- 
Ross-Blume theory. It suffices th a t they invest “as if.” This is analogous to  utility theory: an 
agent whose choices are rational (e.g., satisfy the Von Neum ann-M orgenstern axioms) need 
not literally maximize expected utility; she could merely act “as if” maximizing expected 
utility.
To test our conjecture, we use a sample of actively managed open-ended equity m utual 
funds for which the holdings d a ta  are most complete. In all empirical tests, we use t a , 
which is the investment alpha of incremental portfolio scaled by its standard  error, as 
the proxy for investment direction. The overall results support our hypotheses. We find 
th a t direction is positively correlated w ith fund performance. For example, the four-factor 
alpha spread between the highest and the lowest quintile sorted by ta (our m easure of 
correctness of investment direction) is 1.61% (t-stat=4 .02) per year using gross return. 
We find quantitatively similar spread using fund net return. Based on double sorting, 
active and high t a funds outperform  active but low ta funds significantly. For example, 
funds w ith the highest turnover ratio  and the highest t a produce 3.04% (2.96%) higher 
before- (after-) fee four-factor alpha th an  the funds w ith highest turnover but low ta . The 
spread between high-active-share and high-t« funds and high-active-share and low-t« funds 
averages 1.99% per year. The same spread is 2.78% when double sorting is performed 
based on ta and selectivity. These results rem ain robust when we split the sample based 
on fund size. Using regressions, we show th a t activeness becomes more effective when ta is
higher. By interacting turnover ratio, active share, and selectivity w ith dum my variables 
for the t a ’s cross-sectional quintiles, we find th a t coefficients generally increase, except when 
selectivity is used as m easure of activeness. The coefficients of the activeness measures in 
the first quintile are generally negative, suggesting th a t the activeness may even hurt the 
performance when the investing direction is not correct. Finally, investors appear to  react 
to  the direction of funds’ portfolio changes. Indeed, we find th a t ta positively predicts 
subsequent quarter's  fund flow.
Our results are robust to  different samples and different specifications. We test our 
hypotheses in a new sample constructed as in P asto r et al. (2015b). Using the regression 
framework developed in P asto r et al. (2015a), we are able to  identify a significant interaction 
effect between t a and turnover ratio. Double sorting results are also supportive when we 
use grossR ,  the M orningstar Category Index adjusted gross return, as performance metric.
This paper makes three main contributions. F irst, we derive an empirical measure 
th a t captures investment direction chosen by m utual fund managers, and we show th a t 
this m etric sheds additional light on the fund performance. Second, we help address the 
controversy about the relation between active m anagement and fund performance: we show 
th a t active m anagem ent can improve performance but only when the fund is trading towards 
the mean-variance efficiency. Third, and more broadly, we propose a new concept of alpha, 
namely, investment alpha. This type of alpha can be used to  help investors improve the 
mean-variance trade-off of their current holdings. Unlike evaluation alpha, investment alpha 
is “model-free.” T hat is, one does not need an equilibrium asset pricing model for it to  work, 
and thus is immune to  the “bad model” problem.
The rem ainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we construct our main 
investment direction metric,. Section 2.3 describes the d a ta  sources and sample construction 
process. We present our main results in section 2.4, and robustness tests in section 2.5. 
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Measuring Direction
2.2.1 T h eoretica l M otivation  o f Investm en t A lpha
Alpha is a concept of abnorm al return, where the “normal re tu rn” is defined by some 
asset pricing model. Therefore, alpha must be paired w ith an asset pricing model. For 
example, Jensen’s Alpha refers to  the alpha estim ated based on the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1969). The most common use of alpha 
is to  evaluate the performance of an investment (Jensen (1968)). The idea is th a t alpha
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represents the part of the retu rn  th a t is not explained by the risk-return trade off as specified 
by the asset pricing model. Thus, alpha can capture the superior skill of a portfolio manager, 
i.e., the ability to  generate higher returns w ithout bearing additional risks. However, this 
in terpretation requires the models used to  estim ate alpha to  fully characterize the risk-return 
trade off. If there is a specification error, then  the in terpretation of the alpha is ambiguous. 
Positive alphas can be a ttribu ted  either to  the portfolio m anager’s skill or to  some type 
of risk th a t is missing from the asset pricing model. Roll (1978) highlights this problem 
and shows th a t the estim ate of a lpha10 is very sensitive to  the imperfect proxy of market 
portfolio. In this paper, we call this type of alphas “evaluation alpha.”
Here, we propose a different way of interpreting alpha. We call this type of alpha 
“investment alpha.” To illustrate the idea, le t’s consider following form ulation of alpha:
&i,b = E [R i -  R f  ] -  A,b(E [R b -  R f  ]) (2.1)
where R i is the return  of some portfolio and Rb is the return  of some benchmark. fatb is 
the beta  coefficient of portfolio i w ith respect to  portfolio b, i.e., ^ i;b = cov(R i , R b) /v a r (R b). 
Notice when Rb is the m arket portfolio, then a itb is the Jensen’s Alpha. B ut the definition of 
alpha in (2.1) is more general. The benchm ark here can be any portfolio. It is particularly 
meaningful if we consider b as the investor’s current holdings in this paper. Assuming th a t 
we find a i;b > 0 the following two statem ents hold: (a) the benchm ark portfolio on the right 
hand side is mean-variance suboptim al; (b) by combining Ri and Rb, one can improve the 
mean-variance efficiency of Rb. The statem ent (a) is a direct result of Rolls Critique (Roll 
(1977)). In his famous critique on empirical tests of CAPM, Richard Roll shows th a t if 
Rb in equation (2.1) is the return  of an ex post mean-variance efficient portfolio in a given 
sample, then a i;b = 0 for any stock i in th a t sample. The statem ent (b) was proven by 
Dybvig and Ross (1985) in their Theorem  5. A similar result is obtained in Blume (1984). 
Additionally, Michael R. Gibbons (1989) also prove the statem ent (b) in their paper and 
construct the well known Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (GRS) test statistic  based on it.
Here, we call a iyb in equation (2.1) as the investment alpha of portfolio i for the investor 
who is holding b. For this investor, the investment alpha provides a clear indication on 
whether the investor should buy or sell portfolio i . Notice, to  estim ate investment alpha, 
the key input is the investor’s current holdings. Those are not typically available. Since 
m utual funds are required to  report their holdings, they become suitable for this exercise.
10Jensen’s A lpha in this context
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2.2.2 Investm en t D irection
We wish to  infer whether m anagers choose the right direction from the available da ta  
by applying the idea of investment alpha. The d a ta  we have are snapshots of m utual fund 
quarterly  holdings from the Thomson R euters M utual Fund Holdings D atabase.11 From 
quarter q -  1 to  q, the holdings of a m utual fund f  change from H f_1 to  H q . For brevity 
we shall omit the superscript f  in all following notations. H q is a vector where element i 
is the num ber of shares of stock i, s i>q, held by the fund at q. We focus on the number 
of shares rather than  the weights because share changes capture the real active part of 
fund m anagement, while weight changes could be purely driven by m arket price fluctuation 
w ithout m anagers actively changing the num ber of shares.
We could take two approaches to  m easure the correctness of the investment direction 
of a m anager. We can estim ate investment alpha for each stock w ithin the held portfolio, 
and then examine w hether the fund increased (decreased) the weights for stocks th a t had 
positive (negative) investment alphas. This approach, although intuitive, is subject to 
serious estim ation error. It has been well known th a t the variance-covariance structures 
of individual stocks are estim ated w ith error (Jensen et al. (1972), Fam a and M acBeth 
(1973)), and this leads to  errors in estim ating individual alphas. The most common and 
simple practice to  deal w ith such estim ation error is to  use a portfolio. Thus, instead of 
estim ating investment alpha at the individual stock level, we estim ate investment alpha 
for one single portfolio, the incremental portfolio. This portfolio consists of all the stocks 
(held by the fund) whose num ber of shares have been changed from quarter q - 1  to  q, with 
weights proportional to  the changes in shares. If a fund m anager follows the portfolio theory 
from Dybvig and Ross (1985a) and Blume (1984) to  marginally improve the mean-variance 
efficiency of her portfolio, she will increase (decrease) positions on securities w ith positive 
(negative) investment alpha. The incremental portfolio is the result of this individual 
adjustm ent process, and will have long (short) positions in securities w ith positive (negative) 
investment alpha. Thus, the incremental portfolio itself will have positive investment alpha.
Specifically, we construct the incremental portfolio as following. The holdings change 
from q -  1 to  q is denoted H q^  = H q -  H q-1. If stock i was not included in the portfolio at 
q - 1  but was a t q, then  we augment H q-1 with i, setting s i,q_1 = 0, and vice versa. We define 
the incremental portfolio to  be the portfolio based on the holdings vector H ^  as follows:
n M utual funds disclose their holdings quarterly. Before 2005, m utual funds were required to  report their 
holdings only semi-annually, bu t more th an  half of the funds still reported their holdings quarterly. Since 
2005, m utual funds have to  report their holdings every quarter.
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WqA -  H/A p q 1 -  (w i^ q wA)q -  ww,q) > (2.2)
H q ' Pq- 1
where • stands for dot(scalar) product and o denotes the element-wise product, Pq-1 is the 
vector of prices with elements being the price of stock i in (at the end of) quarter q - 1. The 
incremental portfolio captures the portfolio th a t the fund invested in on top of H q-1 in order 
to  arrive H q. The investment alpha of portfolio W A  reveals the correctness of the investment 
direction. The benchm ark portfolio used to  estim ate the incremental portfolio’s investment 
alpha is the portfolio based on holdings H q-1, i.e. Wq-1 -  (H q-1 o Pq-1) / ( H q-1 • Pq-1).
Using the portfolio weights vector WA, we can recover the historical returns (past 36 
m onthly returns) of the incremental portfolio from individual stock returns:
rA- l-1 -  ^ 1  ri,Tq-l-1
^ - l - S  -  1*^1 Wt  riTq-l-S (2.3)
r Tq-i-36 -  S N 1 wtq ri,Tq-l-36
In (2.3), ri,Tq-l-s is the retu rn  for stock i over month  r q-1 -  s, and rq-1 indicates the last 
m onth of quarter q -  1. Similarly, we can recover the historical return  of the portfolio at 
the end of quarter q -  1 based on Wq-1, following the same logic:
rTq-l-1 -  Ei=1 Wi,q-1ri,Tq-l-1
rTq-i-s -  S i=1 w i,q-1ri,Tq-i-s (2.4)
rTq-i-36 -  S i=1 wi,q-1ri,Tq-1-36
Notice in both  Equation 2.3 and Equation 2.4, we use the weights from WA and Wq-1 
to  construct historical returns. We do this intentionally because we want to  estim ate the 
investment alpha of the particular increm ental portfolio defined by WA w .r.t. the particular 
“currently held” portfolio defined by Wq-1.
W ith  the historical returns of incremental portfolios and previously held portfolios thus 
computed, we can the estim ate the investment alpha of the incremental portfolio by running 
a time-series regression for each fund (with fund subscript om itted; r f  denotes the risk free 
rate):
r tA -  r f t  -  a  + 7 ( r t -  r f )  + "  (2.5)
The main estim ate of interest is the intercept in Equation 2.5. This is the investment 
alpha of the incremental portfolio. To further control for the estim ation error, we use the 
t-s ta tis tic  of the intercept ra ther th an  the estim ate of the intercept as our main variable of 
interest. We label it ta .
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2.2 .3  D iscu ssion  abou t th e  E m pirical D esign
The estim ation period consists of the 36 months till the last m onth of quarter q -  1. 
We then  study fund performance from (the end of) quarter q - 1  to  (the end of) quarter q. 
As such, our study is not strictly  predictive. The purpose of our study was to  determ ine 
w hat happened to  returns of funds th a t invested in the correct direction over the period 
(q -  1,q), while disentangling the im pact of activeness and direction. The goal was not to 
propose another predictor for future fund performance. It is im portant to  note th a t our 
study does not suffer from hindsight bias. We strictly exclude any retu rn  inform ation over 
the period (q -  1, q) in estim ating ta ; likewise, we do not use any stock price information at 
tim e q (the end of quarter q). We do need holdings changes from tim e q -  1 to  q, in order 
to  determ ine w hat funds did (in order to  determ ine the incremental portfolio composition), 
bu t performance cannot be derived from mere knowledge of their holdings changes.
2.3 Data and Sample Construction
The d a ta  was draw n from two m ajor m utual fund databases. We obtained fund historical 
returns, to ta l net asset (TNA), fees, turnover ratios, and other fund characteristics from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices Survivor-Bias-Free M utual Fund D atabase. M utual 
fund holdings d a ta  were extracted from the Thomson Reuters M utual Fund Holdings 
D atabase. A ntti P e ta jis to ’s website12 provided active share data. The details for con­
struction of this measure is documented in P etajisto  (2013).
We focus on domestic equity funds. The holdings d a ta  is most complete for this sample. 
We started  by identifying in the CRSP dataset a sample of domestic equity m utual funds 
based on fund styles. Following Bessler et al. (2010), we used a combination of Lipper, 
W iesenberger, and Strategic Insight style codes. We first selected funds based on a set of 
Lipper style codes. If Lipper code was missing, we filtered on a set of W iesenberger style 
codes. If both  Lipper and W iesenberger codes were missing, we filtered on a set of Strategic 
Insight codes.13 To further account for any incompleteness or inaccuracy, we applied style 
filters from the Thomson Reuters M utual Fund Holdings database. Specifically, we excluded 
International, M unicipal Bonds, Bond and Preferred and Balanced funds. We also excluded
12http: / / w w w .petajisto .net/data.h tm l
13Lipper style codes were CA, EI, EIEI, G, GI, I, LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, MC, M CCE, M CGE, MCVE, 
MLCE, MLGE, MLVE, SCCE, FS, H, NR, S, SESE, TK, TL, and UT; W iesenberger codes were AGG, G, 
G-I, G-I-S, G-S, G-S-I, GCI, GRI, GRO, IG, I-G-S, I-S, I-S-G, IEQ, ING, LTG, MCG, S-G, S-GI, S-I-G, 
S-I, SCG, ENR, FIN, HLT, TCH, and UTL; Strategic Insight codes were AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, 
SCG, ENV, FIN, HLT, NTR, SEC, TEC, and UTI.
index funds 14. Because CRSP reports d a ta  on fund share class level while Thomson Reuters 
reports holdings at fund level, we aggregated share classes using MFLINKs. We required 
funds to  have Total Net Assets (in 2013 dollars) of at least 5 million. However, once a fund 
passed the $5 million threshold first tim e after inception, we no longer excluded this fund 
even if its TNA dropped below $5 million afterwards. Since both  Cremers and Petajisto  
(2009) and Amihud and Goyenko (2013) started  their sample around 1990, we started  our 
sample from 1990 and stopped in 2013. Then we m atched the sample w ith holdings data. 
Our final sample includes about 2,965 unique m utual funds from 1990 to  2013.
In Table 2.1, we report the sum m ary of statistics. On average, the fund size is $1,517 
million (in 2013 dollars). Consistent with established stylized fact th a t active m utual fund 
fail to  generate superior performance, we find the t-s ta tis tic  of the past 36 months four-factor 
alpha is -0.23. Fund average annual expense ratio  is about 1.2%, and average turnover ratio 
is round 95%. The average active share is 80% and selectivity is 14%. In Table 2.2, we 
sort funds into quintile-based ta and then report average values of fund characteristics for 
each quintile. The lowest quintile has an average ta of about -1.74 and the highest one is 
1.44. From lowest to  highest, the fund size, turnover ratio, and expense ratio  rem ain almost 
constant. Factor loadings on the four-factor model are the same, except th a t the loadings 
on the m om entum  factor increase slightly. P ast performance, m easured by four-factor alpha 
from prior 36 months, does not exhibit any particular pattern . Average m onthly fund flow 
increases across quintiles. These univariate results show th a t ta does not correlate with 
most fund characteristics, reducing the concern th a t t a is confounded w ith other factors.
I t is also interesting to  look how the investment alpha is distributed empirically across all 
the funds. In Figure 2.1, we show the histogram  of t a based all the observations. In general, 
ta is centered around 0 and seems normally d istributed (with slight negative skewness). The 
empirical d istribution of ta implies th a t actively m anaged m utual funds in our sample do 
not invest towards the correct direction on average. This coincides w ith the stylized fact 
th a t actively managed m utual funds do not outperform  the passive funds in aggregate.
Another im portant property to  investigate is the persistence of investment alpha. There 
is a large literature on cross-sectional persistence of evaluation alphas. As shown in C arhart 
(1997) and Brown and Goetzm ann (1995), the fund performance usually persists on the 
losing side but not on the winning side. To provide a simple and intuitive description on 
the persistence of investment alpha, we do the following. In each quarter, we sort fund
23
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into quintiles based on their investment alphas. The we look backwards and forwards up 
to  5 quarters to  calculate the average t a for each quintile. In Figure 2.2, we plot the 
average t a for each quintile in each relative quarter. Clearly, investment alpha exhibits 
little persistence. The top quintile rem ain top in 2 quarters around the sorting period. 
However, the difference between top quintile and other quintiles become very small. The 
bottom  quintile is somewhat persistent up to  3 quarters around the sorting period. All 
the quintiles almost converge at -5 and +5 quarters. There are two possible explanations 
for the lack of persistence. Firstly, m utual fund m anagers are not acting as prescribed by 
Dybvig-Ross-Blume. They use different m ethods to  make portfolio choices. And when they 
act as i f  they are making marginal improvements, their funds outperform . B ut since they 
are not consciously following investment a lpha’s direction, investment alphas do not persist. 
Secondly, fund managers might be aware of the m arginal improvement. B ut when they make 
correct decisions and thus outperform , they a ttrac t a capital inflow to  the fund. W hen the 
fund grows, it becomes difficult for them  to find space to  make m arginal improvements. 
This is the diseconomy of scale story offered by Berk and Green (2004) when they try  to 
explain why m utual fund investors chase fund performance even the performance does not 
persist.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Investm en t D irection  and Perform ance
We sta rt our analysis by examining the relation between t a and fund performance. Our 
hypothesis is th a t funds w ith high t a should perform at least as well as those with low t a . 
The intuition is straightforw ard. High (low) ta funds are trading towards to  right (wrong) 
direction. W hen a fund invests in the right direction, the worst case scenario is to  have 
performance similar to  funds th a t move in the wrong direction. This happens when high ta 
funds are inactive. Thus, we predict th a t ta correlates positively w ith fund performance.
In Table 2.3, we sort funds into quintiles based on t a in each quarter. For each quintile, 
we run four-factor time-series regressions using the portfolio’s m onthly return  and report 
the four-factor alpha. We report results for all funds, small funds, and large funds in Panels 
A, B, and C. In general, four-factor alphas increase w ith t a . For example, in Panel A, high 
ta funds outperform  low ta by 1.63% (t-stat=4 .06) annually. This spread holds for both 
net retu rn  and gross return. The spreads are stronger for large funds and weaker for small 
funds, bu t rem ain robust in both  cases.
In order to  further explore the relation between ta and performance, we run a regressions
with m ultiple control variables. The results are reported in Table 2.4. We put either gross 
return  or net return  on the left hand side. We include regressors fund characteristics such 
as turnover ratio, expense ratio, size and flow. To control for fund risk exposure, we also 
include factor loadings from a four-factor regression over the past 36 months. We include 
tim e fixed effect in our specifications. As shown in P asto r et al. (2015a), the coefficients will 
only reflect cross-sectional variation when tim e fixed effects are included. The coefficients are 
essentially variance-weighted average coefficients from each pure cross-sectional regression. 
This approach is arguably more efficient th an  the pure cross-sectional m ethodology in Fama 
and M acBeth (1973), where the cross-sectional coefficients are equally weighted, because 
the cross-sectional variation is taken into account. We also report regression results for large 
funds and small funds separately. In all 6 specifications, ta has a positive and significant 
coefficient. The results confirms our hypothesis, as well as the sorting results in Table 2.3.
2.4 .2  Investm ent D irection  and Turnover
Turnover ratio  captures how heavy m utual funds trade relative to  the assets under 
m anagement. Ex ante, the prediction of turnover’s im pact on fund performance should be 
neutral. M utual funds will trade  more if they had identified profitable trading opportunities, 
and may therefore lead to  be tte r performance. On the o ther hand, too much trading 
incurs excessive transaction costs, which damages fund performance. Consistent w ith this 
intuition, previous evidence on cross-sectional relation between turnover and performance 
is mixed. Some studies have docum ented a positive relation between the turnover ratio  and 
fund perform ance,15 while others show a negative relation.16
We argued th a t investment direction, m easured by ta , should be taken into consideration 
when determ ining the relation between activeness and performance. Thus, the m ain focus 
here is the interaction effect between turnover ratio and ta . We rely on double sorts to 
investigate the interaction effect. Our main performance m etric is the popular Fama-French- 
C arhart four-factor alpha. We present results based on before and after fee retu rn  as each 
one of them  answers different im portant questions. Our study is an application of a portfolio 
theory in the context of m utual fund. Gross return  captures the direct effect of a fund 
m anager’s portfolio decision on performance. Thus we m ainly rely on gross return  to  test 
our conjectures. However, even when fund managers make correct portfolio decisions, the
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benefit may be extracted by the m anagement through higher-fund fees. Therefore, it is 
im portant to  also determ ine whether investors can benefit from portfolio decisions using 
net return.
In Table 2.5, we sort funds into quintiles based on ta first. Then within each ta quintile, 
we further sort funds into quintiles based on turnover ratio. Thus the values of t a are 
held constant across turnover ratio quintiles. The sorting produces 25 fund portfolios. The 
portfolios are rebalanced quarterly  as t a is updated quarterly. We report Fama-French- 
C arhart four-factor alphas estim ated using fund m onthly gross return. In the top  panel, 
the results are based on all the funds in our sample. Consistent with one-way sorting 
results, fund performance increases w ith ta in general. More careful exam ination yields the 
following observations. F irst, four-factor alphas increase from first row to fifth row (i.e., 
across ta quintiles), and the m agnitude of the increment becomes larger when turnover 
ratio  is higher. The spread between highest and lowest ta quintiles increases w ith turnover 
ratio  from 0.7% to  3.04%. Second, when looking at the sorting results along the turnover 
ratio  dimension, we find th a t for the first 4 rows, the spreads of four-factor alphas between 
highest and lowest turnover ratio  quintiles are not statistically  different from 0. However, 
for the highest ta quintile, the four-factor alphas get more positive and significant across 
turnover ratio  quintiles, from 0.75% to 2.88% per year, producing a 2.13% (t-stat= 2.68) 
spread in annual four-factor alpha. These results are consistent with our conjecture th a t 
direction plays an im portant role in fund performance. Moreover, when funds become less 
active (low turnover ratio), even if they trade  in the correct direction (high ta ), they do 
not outperform . W hen funds trade in the wrong direction, being more active does not help 
either.
In the middle and bottom  panel of Table 2.5, we perform the same sorting on large and 
small funds, defined by fund's Total Net Assets quintiles. The overall results rem ain similar. 
For large funds, the effect of turnover ratio  becomes weaker for high t a quintile, bu t the 
underperform ance of funds w ith low t a becomes stronger when turnover ratio  is high. The 
results from small funds are much noisier. In Table 2.6, we report four-factor alphas based 
on net returns to  see the wealth effects on investors. In general, we observe very similar 
pa tte rn  as in Table 2.5. B ut now the spread is mainly driven by negative four-factor alphas 
from low ta funds, instead of positive four-factor alphas from high ta funds.
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 report four-factor alphas. These provides risk adjustm ent in 
ways th a t interest academic researchers. It is interesting though to  also investigate the 
im pact of direction and activeness when we control im portant fund characteristics such
26
as fund size, flow, expense ratio, past performance, and risk exposure in a m ultivariate 
context. We interact turnover ratio with indicator variables for t a quintiles, which allows 
the coefficient on turnover ratio to  change across t a quintiles. By comparing the coefficients 
across t a quintiles, we can see w hether active m anagement will be more effective when the 
investment direction is correct. Specifically, we run the following regression model:
5 5
Ti,t = d t  + b lA ij  + ^  bkAij X 1 Q (ta )=k + X! c k ^ Q ( t a )=k + l ^ i , t  + £i,t (2-6)
k=2 k=2
where at is the time-fixed effect, is level of activeness (turnover, active share and 
selectivity) ( ta ) is a indicator if the cross-sectional quintile of ta is k, and includes 
controls such as fund size, past performance, past flow, risk exposure. By including the 
tim e fixed effect a t , the regression coefficients are essentially weighted average of cross­
sectional regression coefficients, where the weights are proportional to  variance and number 
of observations in each cross-section.17
In Table 2.7, we report regression results from Equation 2.6 when turnover ratio  is 
considered as proxy of activeness, for both  gross return  and net return, and for the full 
sample, and stratification by large and small funds18. Our main focus is on the change of 
the coefficients to  turnover ratio. The coefficient of turnover ratio  alone (first row) in this 
regression is actually the coefficient for the first ta quintile. Across different specifications 
(columns), this coefficient is always negative and significant for the full sample and for 
large funds. Recall th a t the first ta quintile contains funds trading in the wrong direction. 
More activeness can only hurt the performance in this case. Coefficients to  turnover  * ta (i) 
capture the difference for quintile i relative to  the first quintile. The coefficients generally 
increase from i = 2 to  i = 5. The increments are more significant among large funds. For 
example, in the th ird  column, the difference of turnover ratio  coefficients between the fifth 
ta quintile and the first t a quintile is 24.7. The to ta l effect of turnover ratio  for the fifth 
ta quintile is 11.6 (= 24.7 + (-13 .1 )). Overall, the results are very similar w ith gross return  
(first three columns) and net return  (last three columns) as regressand.
In short, the regression results show th a t active m anagement becomes more effective 
when the investment direction is correct. This interaction effect is strong for large funds 
but weak for smaller ones. W hen turnover ratio  is used to  proxy m utual fund activeness,
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the results are consistent w ith our conjecture. Investm ent direction is key in determ ining 
how effective active m anagement is in generating superior fund performance.
2.4 .3  Investm en t D irection  and A ctiv e  Share
Cremers and P etajisto  (2009) and P etajisto  (2013) introduce active share as a measure 
of m utual fund active m anagement. Active share is com puted as 1 ^ N=1 \wfund,i -  w index>i\, 
where w fundi  is the weight of stock i in fund and windex,i is the weight of stock i in the 
index th a t is disclosed as benchm ark in the fund prospectus.19 This m easure has a nice 
interpretation. If active share equals 1, then  the fund has no overlap in holdings with 
its benchmark. If active share is 0, then the fund holds exactly the same assets as its 
benchmark. Active share has been shown to  predict future fund performance and therefore 
a ttrac ted  a lot a tten tion  in both  academia and industry. We would argue th a t active share 
can viewed as a proxy for m utual fund activeness. To beat its benchmark, a fund must 
deviate from its benchmark. However, simply holding a deviating portfolio should not 
guarantee superior performance. An im portant missing dimension is direction: only funds 
th a t deviate in the correct way should generate be tter performance.
To test our hypothesis, we perform similar double sorting based on ta and active share, 
and report results in Table 2.8 (gross return) and Table 2.9 (net return). We find some 
evidence to  support our conjecture. In Table 2.8, high ta funds are able to  outperform  low 
ta funds when active share is high. For example, highest t a funds minus lowest t a funds 
yield an annualized spread of about 2% (t-sta t =  2.61) for the full sample, 3.2% (t-s ta t =  
2.07) for large funds, and 3.33% (t-s ta t =  1.56) for small funds. High active share funds 
outperform  low active share funds by about 1.7% per year when ta is high in the full sample. 
For net return  results (Table 2.9), funds in highest t a quintile outperform  those in lowest 
ta quintile only when active share is high.
However, we find only weak evidence th a t high active share funds outperform  overall. 
For example, in the top panel of Table 2.8, high active share funds outperform  low active 
share funds by 1.68% per year only when t a is in the highest quintile. This spread is similar 
for small and large funds, bu t no longer significant. In Table 2.9, the spreads between high 
active share and low active share funds are not significant. The potential explanation for 
lack of significance is th a t Cremers and P etajisto  (2009) use benchm ark adjusted retu rn  to 
estim ate four-factor alpha, while we use funds returns w ithout subtracting their benchm ark
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We present regression results based on Equation 2.6 in Table 2.10. The purpose is again 
to  see if the coefficient of active share on fund performance changes across t a quintiles. 
The coefficient of active share itself is in fact the coefficient of active share in the first 
ta quintile, and active share*ta (i) is the difference between the coefficient of active share 
in ith  ta quintile and the coefficient of active share in the first quintile. We find th a t 
the coefficients for quintiles 2 to  5 are indeed significantly (t-s ta t around 2) larger than  
th a t of the first quintile, suggesting th a t active share is more effective in generating better 
performance when ta is higher. Still, the coefficients do not increase m onotonically from 
the second to  the fifth quintile.
In summary, we find evidence to  support our hypothesis when considering active share 
as a m easure of fund activeness. The results are weaker than  when we use turnover ratio 
to  proxy activeness. We offer a potential explanation here. Active share is the deviation of 
a fund’s holdings from its benchmark. Active m anagement is indeed required to  deviate, 
bu t after the deviation it is not necessarily the case th a t a fund m anager keeps being 
active -  in fact, she has to  do nothing to  keep active share equal. For instance, if a fund 
shifts its style after inception, it will have high active share even if it remains completely 
passive. Confirming our speculation, Cremers and P etajisto  (2009) show th a t there is very 
low correlation between active share and turnover ratio.
2.4 .4  Investm en t D irection  and S electiv ity
In the spirit of Cremers and P etajisto  (2009), and to  measure for m utual fund active 
m anagement, Amihud and Goyenko (2013) propose to  use one minus R-squared, which 
is estim ated from four-factor time-series regressions. They call this m easure “selectivity” 
and argue it is a simpler, yet effective m easure to  capture fund activeness and selectivity. 
Selectivity has a few advantages over active share. F irst, it is easy to  calculate, because 
it does not require any holdings data . Second, it is more general because it measures how 
different the fund is from common risk factors ra ther than  fund-specific benchmarks. Active 
share is subject to  the concern of style shifting over tim e (Sensoy (2009)).
Here, we consider selectivity to  be another proxy for fund activeness, and test its 
interaction effect w ith ta . We repeat previous double sorting exercise and report results in 
Table 2.11 (gross return) and Table 2.12 (net return). We find the results supportive in
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20One of the points of critique made in Frazzini et al. (2015) is th a t the positive alpha of active funds is
from the under-performance of a fund’s benchm ark ra ther than  superior performance of the fund itself.
general. Funds w ith high selectivity outperform  low selectivity funds when t a is high. The 
spread between high t a and low ta increases with selectivity. The sorting results are strong 
for the full sample, robust for large funds, and more noisy for smaller funds. In Table 2.13, 
we report the regression results where we interact selectivity with indicators of ta quintiles. 
However, we did not find th a t coefficients increase across ta quintiles. The coefficients 
of interaction term s are mostly insignificant, suggesting th a t the effect of selectivity on 
performance does not vary much with ta .
Overall, when selectivity is considered as m easure of activeness, the sorting results are 
very supportive to  our conjecture, bu t the m ultivariate regression results are not.
2.4 .5  Investm ent D irection  and Fund Flow
Are investors able to  identify the funds th a t conduct active m anagem ent in the right 
direction, and then  invest in those funds? Since Berk and Green (2004), academics have 
started  to  realize th a t the m utual fund industry, unlike other industries, equilibrates through 
capital flows instead of prices (fund fees are fixed most of the tim e as percentage of assets 
under m anagem ent). Thus, an investor’s reaction to  fund m anager investment decisions 
should be evaluated using fund flows. The existing evidence shows th a t investors react to 
past fund performance (e.g., Lynch and M usto (2003) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997)), 
although little persistence is found on outperform ing funds (C arhart (1997)). Berk and 
Green (2004) argue the investors are nevertheless m aking rational decisions, because the 
com petition among investors drive away any net abnorm al retu rn  and fund managers extract 
the rents through fees. In a recent study, Berk and van Binsbergen (2016) use fund flow to 
assess asset pricing models and find th a t the performance-flow relation does exist and th a t 
investors care about CAPM  alpha (Jensen’s Alpha) most, among a large set of evaluation 
alphas. However, the overall results show th a t there is not much difference between popular 
models used to  estim ate evaluation alpha. For example, CAPM  Alpha and FFC Alpha 
(estim ated using Fam a-French-Carhart four-factor model) have almost the same probability 
(around 63%) th a t, conditional on a positive alpha, the sign of fund flows is positive.
Unlike past fund performance, the investment direction is not easily accessible to  and 
understandable for m utual fund investors. Thus, one should not really expect much pre­
dictive power from ta on fund flows. Nevertheless, to  test w hether investors react to  ta , we 
regressed future fund m onthly flows on t a as well as other fund characteristics th a t may 
have affected fund flows. The results are reported in Table 2.14. The dependent variable is 
the m onthly fund flow calculated by:
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flow = T N A t  -  T N A t - i ( l  + r , ) (2 .7)
J T N A t v ;
where T N A t is the fund Total Net Assets at m onth t, and r t is fund retu rn  for m onth t. All 
the independent variables are lagged by one quarter. All the three models presented in the 
table are based on the same specification except we use different measures of activeness. A 
quick preview shows th a t coefficients on loadings of value and m om entum  factors are positive 
and significant, suggesting some m utual fund investors are a ttrac ted  by the “be ta .” On the 
o ther hand, m utual fund investors appear to  understand the fund exposure to  m arket and 
size factor, indicated by the indifferent coefficients. Consistently w ith previous evidence, the 
coefficient on past performance, m easured by the t-s ta tis tic  of past 36-month four-factor 
alpha, is the very strong. More im portantly, across three columns, ta has positive and 
significant coefficient after controlling for past performance and other fund characteristics. 
However, the coefficient of t a is smaller than  the coefficient of the t-s ta tis tic  of the four-factor 
alpha estim ated from fund returns over the past 36 months. These results together suggest 
th a t investors do react to  the correct direction, bu t to  a lesser extent th an  past performance.
2.5 Robustness
Almost all the m utual fund studies on holdings use the Thom son-Reuters and CRSP 
databases to  construct samples. Recently a few studies have built new m utual fund samples 
by combining the M orningstar and CRSP m utual fund databases, though those do not 
involve holdings data . Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) build a comprehensive sample of 
m utual funds by uniting the M orningstar and CRSP m utual fund databases. Based on 
Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), P asto r et al. (2015b) constructed a finer sample, again by 
intersecting the M orningstar and CRSP m utual fund databases. Here, for the first time, we 
combine the M orningstar m utual fund database, the standard  CRSP, and Thomson Reuters 
database, and create a new sample, which we use for robustness tests. Our robustness test 
sample is built on top of P asto r et al. (2015b). We first identify a sample of domestic equity 
m utual funds based on M orningstar and CRSP, following the da ta  construction process 
docum ented in the d a ta  appendix of P asto r et al. (2015b).Then, based on the resulting 
sample, we m atch funds to  the Thomson Reuters M utual Fund Holdings database, through 
the CRSP fund identifier.
We conduct two types of robustness tests. F irst, we check w hether ta still interacts 
with activeness, m easured by turnover, bu t now in a time-series framework. Paastor et al. 
(2015a) recently provided new evidence on the turnover-perform ance relation. They found 
th a t turnover predicts fund returns positively over time. They also showed th a t this
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predictive power is much weaker in cross-section. Second, we repeat our cross-sectional 
double sorting exercise on the new sample. This sample allows a new performance measure, 
grossR .  This m easure is defined as the fund before-fee return  minus the fund’s M orningstar 
Category benchm ark return. grossR  was first introduced in P asto r et al. (2015b) and has 
some advantages compared to  Fam a-French-Carhart risk adjustm ents because the factor 
portfolios in the four-factor model cannot be invested in easily. In addition, it provides 
more accurate control on fund styles by taking advantage of M orningstar categories. Our 
robustness tests mainly focus on using turnover ratio  as proxy of activeness for two reasons. 
F irst, based on results in previous section, turnover ratio  seems to  be the best proxy for 
activeness among three measures covered in this study. Second, P asto r et al. (2015a) focused 
solely on turnover ratio. Our robustness sample and test framework are both  based on the 
design in P asto r et al. (2015a).
2.5.1 T im e-Series R elation
Pasto r et al. (2015a) provides novel evidence on turnover-perform ance relation. They 
show th a t when considering the time-series relation between activeness and performance 
ra ther th an  the cross-sectional relation as we did in our previous analysis, turnover ratio  can 
unambiguously predict future performance. This time-series relation is obtained through 
fund fixed effect regressions. P asto r et al. (2015a) show th a t coefficients from a panel 
regression w ith individual fixed effect is equivalent to  the variance-weighted averaging of 
coefficients from pure time-series regressions on each individual fund. They argue th a t funds 
will trade  more when they are facing more profitable trading opportunities. Thus turnover 
ratio  in this context can be interpreted as activeness to  exploit time-varying mispricing. 
We test whether our m easure of direction, ta , can contribute to  this time-series relation 
by interacting ta w ith turnover ratio  using the fixed effects framework proposed by Pasto r 
et al. (2015a).
We estim ate four regression models in Table 2.15. We m ultiply the dependent variable, 
grossR ,  by 10,000 to  convert its unit into basis points, for easier readability. In the first 
column, we regress grossR  on turnover ratio including fund fixed effect and tim e fixed 
effect. We include tim e fixed effects, to  remove any m arket-wide effect. Our results are 
consistent w ith P asto r et al. (2015a). Turnover ratio  is indeed positively associated with 
future performance when fund fixed effects are included. In the second column we run the 
same regression w ith ta as explanatory variable. The coefficient is significantly positive. 
In column 3, we put turnover ratio  and ta together. The results are almost the same as
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in the univariate regression case, suggesting little correlation between turnover ratio and 
ta . We are mostly interested in the interaction effect between ta and turnover ratio. In 
column 4, we interact turnover ratio  w ith dum my variables th a t indicate to  which ta quintile 
(formed cross-sectionally) the fund belongs. This allows us to  get the turnover ratio  for each 
quintile. Similar as in previous results, we find th a t the coefficients on the turnover ratio 
become stronger and more significant when we move from the first quintile (1.11, coefficient 
of variable turnover)  to  fifth quintile (6.81, coefficient of ta (5) * turnover  plus coefficient 
of turnover).
The results in Table 2.15 are consistent with our hypothesis th a t at times when a 
fund trades in the right direction, active m anagement becomes more effective in generating 
outperform ance; when they do not, they cannot generate outperform ance.
2.5.2 C ross-Sectional R elation
W ith the new sample, we can repeat our previous double sorting exercise as well and 
check its robustness. One im portant advantage of the new sample is the availability of 
grossR .  This m easure provides an additional performance metric. We repeat our double 
sorting exercise using grossR .  We sort on ta first, then sort on measures of turnover ratio 
within each t a quintile. In Table 2.16, we report the time-series average of grossR  for the 
resulting portfolios. There are three panels for the entire sample, and for the large and small 
funds subsamples separately. The results are generally consistent with our previous findings. 
In the full sample, funds th a t have high t a and high turnover ratio  tend to  outperform  others. 
In the large-fund sample, highest turnover funds underperform  lowest-turnover funds when 
ta is low, and highest-t« funds outperform  lowest-t« funds when turnover ratio  is high. The 
results are more noisy and weaker for small funds.
2.6 Conclusions
In this study, we started  from the proposition in Dybvig and Ross (1985) and Blume 
(1984) th a t investment alpha provides the direction to  investors to  improve the mean- 
variance efficiency of their portfolio. We apply the intuition behind investment alpha 
to  the m utual fund industry to  address the seemingly puzzling relation between active 
m anagement and performance, where activeness has been found to  positively correlate 
w ith performance. Our hypothesis is th a t activeness and direction interact to  generate 
outperform ance: w ithout good direction, active m anagement is futile; w ithout sufficient 
activeness, good direction may not help. We m easure activeness using turnover, active 
share, and selectivity. We capture direction of a m utual fund’s investments through the
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investment alpha of the fund’s incremental portfolio. The incremental portfolio is the 
portfolio constructed from the changes in holdings from one quarter to  the next. If a m utual 
fund’s holdings are moving towards mean-variance optimality, then the incremental portfolio 
should have a positive investment alpha. We show empirically th a t funds which invest in the 
correct direction experience better performance in term s of Fam a-French-Carhart four-factor 
alpha. Additionally, we find th a t the interaction between direction and acitveness affects 
the fund performance as we hypothesized: funds th a t are more active in a b e tte r direction 
outperform  others. And active m anagement becomes more effective in generating fund 
performance when direction is correct. Finally, we find th a t investors react to  the correct 
investment direction direction, in addition to  the well known effect of past performance on 
future fund flows.
The study abstracts away from the situations where asym m etric information is present. 
A nat R. Adm ati (1985) and Dybvig and Ross (1985b) show th a t when differential informa­
tion among fund managers is considered, the trad itional evaluation alphas have little power 
to  detect abnorm al performance. This applies to  virtually  all the performance measures 
based on linear asset pricing models. We, however, show th a t even when the information 
asym m etry is not incorporated, the investment alpha of the incremental portfolio is still an 
empirically powerful measure to  differentiate the cross-section of the m utual funds on the 
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T able 2.1. Summary statistics of overall sample.
Statistics
Variables Mean St. Dev. Pctl(25) M edian Pctl(75)
ta -0.165 1.178 -0.934 -0.159 0.601
Turnover 0.947 1.594 0.320 0.630 1.110
Activeshare 0.795 0.162 0.695 0.828 0.928
Selec tiv ity 0.143 0.153 0.051 0.095 0.171
T N A  (in 2013 dollar) 1,517.909 5,755.440 78.505 279.778 988.361
Flow 0.007 0.074 -0.016 -0.003 0.014
E xpense 0.012 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.015
b 1.000 0.255 0.889 0.995 1.098
s 0.213 0.382 -0.073 0.130 0.479
h -0.006 0.418 -0.245 0.006 0.238
u 0.023 0.210 -0.078 0.004 0.103
alpha36(t) -0.225 1.270 -1.040 -0.186 0.615
T a b le  2.2. Sum mary of statistics for each quintile.
Variables
ta Quintiles
1 2 3 4 5
ta -1.765 -0.776 -0.169 0.442 1.453
Turnover 0.935 0.927 0.971 0.945 0.957
Activeshare 0.775 0.789 0.802 0.808 0.801
Selec tiv ity 0.133 0.142 0.147 0.148 0.144
T N A  (in 2013 dollar) 1673.463 1526.592 1448.447 1449.013 1491.793
Flow 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008
E xpense 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012
b 1.014 1.002 0.997 0.992 0.996
s 0.190 0.204 0.221 0.228 0.221
h -0.013 -0.012 -0.003 0.007 -0.009
u 0.015 0.021 0.024 0.028 0.027
alpha36(t) -0.343 -0.216 -0.180 -0.192 -0.194
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T able 2.3. Sorting based on investment direction
ta Quintiles
variable 1 2 3 4 5 spread t-val
Full sample based on all funds
net retu rn  -1.38*** -0.86* 











Subsample based on large funds
net retu rn  -2.00*** -1.17** 











Subsample based on small funds
net retu rn  -0.51 -0.11 0.61 0.21 1.40** 1.92 3.41
gross return  1.11 1.37** 1.93*** 1.97*** 2.78** 1.68 3.02
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T a b le  2.4. Investm ent direction and fund performance
All
Gross R eturn  
Large Small All
Net R eturn  
Large Small
ta 2.73 2.75 2.93 2.74 2.63 2.97
(2.41) (1.74) (2.54) (2.41) (1.66) (2.56)
T urnover -2 .06 0.01 - 2.10 -2.14 -0.09 -2.14
(-2.06) (0.002) (-2.15) (-2.15) ( - 0.02) ( - 2.22)
E xpense 413.50 -878.63 237.16 -541.16 -1,722.93 -669.95
(1.61) (-2.06) (0.71) (-2.14) (-4.07) (-2.05)
Flow 461.79 646.52 384.75 468.53 653.19 388.93
(9.48) (3.70) (11.38) (9.43) (3.70) (11.37)
alpha36(t) 2.44 0.57 5.87 2.42 0.51 5.81
(1.17) (0.21) (2.87) (1.15) (0.19) (2.82)
log(tna) -1.63 -0.46 0.32 -1.85 -0.53 -0.18
( - 2.10) (-0.29) (0.15) (-2.48) (-0.33) (-0.08)
b 7.44 0.15 9.20 7.11 0.28 9.04
(0.26) (0.004) (0.33) (0.25) (0.01) (0.32)
s 29.69 27.84 37.87 30.10 27.96 38.61
(1.85) (1.55) (2.55) (1.86) (1.55) (2.58)
h 19.01 14.31 11.75 18.81 14.23 11.83
(1.03) (0.56) (0.77) (1.01) (0.55) (0.77)
u 16.57 2.70 20.68 16.57 2.20 20.34
(0.40) (0.05) (0.58) (0.40) (0.04) (0.57)
Observations 342,850 69,906 64,219 342,850 69,906 64,219
Adjusted R 2 0.73 0.76 0.71 0.73 0.76 0.71
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T able 2.5. Double sorting on investment direction and turnover ratio, gross return
Turnover Quintiles
spread t-valta 1 2 3 4 5
Full sample based on all funds
1 0.05 0.52 -0.1 -0.23 -0.15 -0.2 -0.24
2 0.41 0.59 -0.23 -0.37 0.63 0.22 0.25
3 1.39** 0.67 0.35 0.67 0.75 -0.64 -0.78
4 1* 0.48 0.91 0.88 0.69 -0.31 -0.42
5 0.75 1.27** 1.38** 1.83*** 2.88*** 2.13 2.68
spread 0.7 0.76 1.47 2.06 3.04
t-val 1.16 1.54 2.56 3.44 3.74
Subsample based on large funds
1 -0.69 0.06 -0.67 -1.18 -2.27** -1.58 -1.35
2 1.1 0.53 -0.45 -0.78 -1.16 -2.26 -1.88
3 -0.23 -0.54 -0.94 -0.49 -1.1 -0.87 -0.75
4 0.27 0.32 -0.5 0.81 -0.47 -0.74 -0.78
5 0.28 1.15 0.33 0.9 1.06 0.78 0.66
spread 0.97 1.09 0.99 2.08 3.33
t-val 1.1 1.11 1.11 1.69 2.79
Subsample based on small funds
1 0.56 1.09 1.69 1.93 2.1* 1.55 1.22
2 2.24*** -0.24 1.87* 2.4** 0.48 -1.77 -1.14
3 3.41*** 0.85 2.21** 0.77 3.28** -0.13 -0.09
4 2.26*** 1.76** 2.22** 3.07*** 2 -0.26 -0.18
5 0.8 0.7 3.32*** 4.86*** 5.17*** 4.38 2.71
spread 0.24 -0.4 1.64 2.93 3.07
t-val 0.16 -0.38 1.26 1.97 2.11
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T able 2.6. Double sort on investment direction and turnover ratio, net return.
Turnover Quintiles
spread t-valta 1 2 3 4 5
Full sample based on all funds
1 -0.94* -0.63 -1.28* -1.56** -1.55* -0.61 -0.73
2 -0.53 -0.56 -1.47** -1.64*** -0.82 -0.29 -0.34
3 0.42 -0.61 -0.83 -0.64 -0.74 -1.16 -1.42
4 0.1 -0.61 -0.33 -0.44 -0.75 -0.85 -1.14
5 -0.24 0.14 0.21 0.54 1.41* 1.65 2.07
spread 0.7 0.77 1.48 2.09 2.96
t-val 1.17 1.57 2.56 3.46 3.66
Subsample based on large funds
1 -■1.59** -0.88 -1.82** -2.27** -3.41*** -1.82 -1.52
2 0.27 -0.43 -1.48* -1.84** -2.26* -2.53 -2.09
3 -1.24* -1.52** -1.91** -1.62* -2.2** -0.96 -0.84
4 -0.47 -0.64 -1.56** -0.29 -1.58* -1.11 -1.17
5 -0.72 0.15 -0.72 -0.12 -0.07 0.64 0.54
spread 0.87 1.03 1.1 2.15 3.34
t-val 1.01 1.04 1.23 1.74 2.8
Subsample based on small funds
1 -0.73 -0.28 0.49 0.46 0.45 1.18 0.93
2 0.91 -1.59 0.4 0.81 -1.35 -2.27 -1.44
3 2.1*** -0.67 0.74 -0.83 1.42 -0.68 -0.47
4 0.94 0.5 0.95 1.47 0.17 -0.77 -0.54
5 -0.37 -0.62 1.82 3.28** 3.35** 3.72 2.3
spread 0.37 -0.34 1.33 2.82 2.91
t-val 0.25 -0.33 1.02 1.87 1.99
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turnover -3.524 -13.063 -1.556 -4.191 -14.158 -1.974
(-1.763) ( - 2.101) (-0.634) (-2.117) (-2.283) (-0.815)
turnover * t a (2) 1.825 3.121 0.599 1.927 3.477 0.587
(0.904) (0.474) (0.247) (0.947) (0.527) (0.242)
turnover * t a (3) 1.233 5.069 -1.944 1.394 5.195 -1.869
(0.571) (0.621) (-0.660) (0.646) (0.635) (-0.637)
turnover * t a (4) 1.856 19.452 - 0.022 2.047 19.439 0.053
(1.017) (2.433) (-0.009) (1.119) (2.429) (0.022)
turnover * t a (5) 3.520 24.718 1.081 3.593 25.035 1.002
(1.556) (3.322) (0.383) (1.596) (3.367) (0.358)
t a (2) 3.269 1.711 4.396 3.014 1.187 4.075
(1.062) (0.378) (0.773) (0.981) (0.264) (0.719)
t a (3) 5.796 -0.808 8.241 5.443 - 1.110 7.454
(1.606) (-0.114) (1.370) (1.505) (-0.157) (1.248)
t a (4) 4.020 -5.604 2.116 3.672 -5.905 1.671
(1.158) (-0.981) (0.418) (1.055) (-1.033) (0.332)
t a (5) 8.453 -3.425 9.344 8.157 -4.162 9.051
(2.424) (-0.633) (1.794) (2.367) (-0.775) (1.762)
flow 460.764 579.467 402.607 470.757 586.748 413.329
(9.428) (4.236) (11.004) (9.452) (4.295) (10.981)
alpha3e(t) 2.321 1.297 4.405 2.523 1.333 5.060
(1.128) (0.485) (2.139) (1.218) (0.499) (2.435)
log(tna) - 2.012 -1.255 -1.586 -1.348 -0.776 1.207
(-2.937) ( - 1.120) (-0.823) (-2.014) (-0.687) (0.618)
b 7.245 13.084 5.692 7.859 13.606 6.825
(0.258) (0.386) (0.201) (0.280) (0.401) (0.240)
s 30.500 23.801 35.248 28.934 22.762 33.991
(1.893) (1.402) (2.309) (1.788) (1.338) (2.214)
h 18.545 23.904 9.671 19.484 25.119 10.656
(0.999) (0.989) (0.600) (1.040) (1.034) (0.650)
u 16.752 8.573 18.268 16.409 8.405 17.975
(0.406) (0.165) (0.498) (0.396) (0.162) (0.489)
Observations 342,850 68,472 68,673 342,850 68,472 68,673
Adjusted R2 0.726 0.764 0.700 0.727 0.765 0.701
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T able 2.8. Double sort on investment direction and active share based gross return
t a
Activeshare Quintiles
spread t-val1 2 3 4 5
Full sample based on funds
1 0.08 -0.07 0.07 0.35 0.32 0.24 0.24
2 0.2 0.01 0.56 0.16 0.82 0.62 0.55
3 0.14 0.43 0.14 0.35 0.83 0.69 0.71
4 0.51 0.98 1.67** 1.52 0.83 0.32 0.35
5 0.62 1.1* -0.2 0.96 2.3** 1.68 1.64
spread 0.54 1.18 -0.27 0.61 1.99
t-val 1.32 1.76 -0.36 0.72 2.61
Subsample based on small funds
1 0.55 -2** 0.51 -0.74 -1.66 -2.21 -1.53
2 0.05 -0.26 0.56 -1.72 1.73 1.68 1.38
3 0.26 0.81 -0.81 -0.66 -1.02 -1.28 -0.92
4 0.58 0.12 -0.03 0.93 1.46 0.88 0.61
5 -0.28 0.8 0.27 -0.03 1.5 1.78 1.42
spread -0.83 2.8 -0.24 0.71 3.16
t-val -1.28 2.25 -0.21 0.49 2.07
Subsample based on small funds
1 0.39 1.62 1.22 2.74* -0.42 -0.81 -0.38
2 1.04 0.18 3.01* 5.25*** 1.8 0.75 0.37
3 1.32* 0.93 3.69** -0.5 2.06 0.73 0.36
4 2.33** 2.58** 1.99 3.8** 4.74*** 2.41 1.32
5 1.31 3.51*** 2.66* 1.29 2.92 1.61 0.85
spread 0.92 1.88 1.44 -1.45 3.33
t-val 0.81 1.27 0.8 -0.8 1.56
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T able 2.9. Double sort on investment direction and active share based net return
t a
Activeshare Quintiles
spread t-val1 2 3 4 5
Full sample based on all funds
1 -0.73* -1.19* -1.02 -0.98 -0.93 -0.19 -0.2
2 -0.68* -1.02** -0.57 -1.05 -0.58 0.1 0.09
3 -0.81** -0.84 -1 -0.93 -0.59 0.21 0.22
4 -0.53 0.02 0.38 0.21 -0.36 0.17 0.19
5 -0.44 -0.02 -1.25 -0.25 0.88 1.32 1.25
spread 0.3 1.17 -0.24 0.73 1.81
t-val 0.73 1.77 -0.31 0.91 2.38
Subsample based on large funds
1 -0.2 -2.88*** -0.57 -1.76* -2.63* -2.43 -1.68
2 -0.86* -1.08 -0.51 -2.26* -0.44 0.42 0.35
3 -0.52 -0.24 -1.85** -1.69 -2.01 -1.49 -1.09
4 -0.39 -0.72 -1.06 -0.05 0.15 0.54 0.37
5 -1.08** -0.18 -0.78 -0.99 0.04 1.12 0.91
spread -0.88 2.7 -0.21 0.77 2.67
t-val -1.3 2.35 -0.18 0.54 1.76
Subsample based on small funds
1 -1.12 0.08 -0.83 1.52 -2.44 -1.31 -0.6
2 0.49 0.16 1.56 4.26** -0.05 -0.54 -0.25
3 -0.51 -0.87 2.41 -1.82 -0.34 0.18 0.09
4 1.11 1.42 1.01 1.78 3.75** 2.64 1.34
5 0.44 1.08 2.03 -1.43 2.15 1.71 0.92
spread 1.56 1 2.86 -2.94 4.59
t-val 1.45 0.67 1.62 -1.63 2.07
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activeshare -0.632 -28.896 -5.798 -8.621 -34.529 -13.455
(-0.028) (-1.108) (-0.166) (-0.382) (-1.323) (-0.384)
activeshare * ta (2) 26.786 33.830 70.485 29.110 33.740 72.912
(2.065) (1.354) (2.083) (2.245) (1.350) (2.149)
activeshare * ta (3) 25.767 27.537 54.255 27.498 27.812 55.769
(1.798) (0.983) (1.728) (1.938) (0.993) (1.794)
activeshare * ta (4) 18.919 33.311 15.614 21.344 34.596 14.348
(1.485) (1.378) (0.515) (1.682) (1.419) (0.469)
activeshare * ta (5) 27.401 31.631 54.119 28.358 29.462 55.950
(2.173) (1.502) (1.715) (2.243) (1.408) (1.764)
ta(2) -17.425 -22.726 -55.988 -19.405 -22.740 -57.563
(-1.683) (-1.289) (-2.156) (-1.877) (-1.291) (-2.201)
ta(3) -17.206 -19.297 -46.498 -18.980 -19.606 -47.968
(-1.384) (-0.914) (-1.914) (-1.534) (-0.928) (-1.991)
ta(4) -8.591 -17.605 -7.776 -10.699 -18.656 -6.326
(-0.775) (-1.019) (-0.319) (-0.967) (-1.067) (-0.257)
ta(5) -14.456 -14.125 -42.855 -15.708 -12.939 -44.673
(-1.402) (-1.011) (-1.701) (-1.518) (-0.927) (-1.760)
flow 369.435 577.113 327.924 377.378 584.642 340.692
(4.626) (2.540) (5.211) (4.692) (2.576) (5.369)
alpha 36 (t) 2.668 2.376 4.565 3.031 2.572 5.209
(1.355) (0.792) (2.131) (1.530) (0.864) (2.423)
)atnalog -2.574 -0.752 -5.397 -2.156 -0.289 -5.095
(-3.480) (-0.607) (-1.438) (-2.984) (-0.232) (-1.371)
b 0.096 -2.541 -17.375 0.043 -3.154 -16.256
(0.003) (-0.073) (-0.625) (0.001) (-0.091) (-0.580)
s 25.521 30.457 34.780 24.764 30.432 34.239
(1.153) (1.380) (1.505) (1.115) (1.379) (1.469)
h 20.336 29.066 7.483 21.621 29.648 9.110
(0.901) (1.283) (0.332) (0.955) (1.308) (0.401)
u 6.663 8.399 26.199 6.171 5.718 27.101
(0.151) (0.153) (0.677) (0.139) (0.104) (0.695)
Observations 159,307 31,772 31,944 159,307 31,772 31,944
Adjusted R2 0.761 0.798 0.736 0.763 0.799 0.737
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T able 2.11. Double sort on investment direction and selectivity based gross return
Selectivity Quintiles
spread t-valt a 1 2 3 4 5
Full sample based on all funds
1 -0.8 -1.27* -0.12 0.85 0.54 1.33 1.34
2 -0.36 -0.55 0.12 1.6** 0.86 1.22 1.13
3 -0.19 0.13 0.49 1.68** 0.96 1.16 1.1
4 -0.2 0.54 0.97 1.6** 0.71 0.92 0.9
5 0.15 0.17 1.11 2.23*** 3.32*** 3.16 3.39
spread 0.95 1.44 1.23 1.38 2.78
t-val 2.12 2.32 1.85 2.45 3.34
Subsample based on large funds
1 -0.32 -1.27* -1.8** -1.25 -0.46 -0.13 -0.11
2 0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.31 0.28 0.08 0.06
3 -0.8 -0.26 -0.51 -0.17 -1.01 -0.21 -0.15
4 -0.56 -0.03 1.09 0.96 -0.25 0.31 0.22
5 -0.87 0.6 0.12 1.52* 1.36 2.23 1.63
spread -0.55 1.87 1.91 2.77 1.82
t-val -0.95 1.89 2.03 2.41 1.17
Subsample based on small funds
1 -0.17 0.33 1.08 1.05 3.99*** 4.16 2.55
2 -0.45 0.93 1.72* 2.75*** 2.19 2.64 1.64
3 1.61** 1.4 1.61 2.54*** 3.73** 2.12 1.22
4 0.96 2.75*** 1.55 2.4** 2.33* 1.36 1.09
5 1.6* 2.57*** 1.08 4.88*** 3.24** 1.64 1.09
spread 1.77 2.24 0 3.83 -0.76
t-val 1.83 2.11 0 3.19 -0.45
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T able 2.12. Double sort on investment direction and selectivity based net return
Selectivity Quintiles
spread t-valta 1 2 3 4 5
Full sample based on all funds
1 -■1.59*** -2.29*** -1.35** -0.46 -0.92 0.67 0.67
2 -1.18*** -1.68*** -0.98* 0.38 -0.93 0.25 0.23
3 - 1.25*** -1.12** -0.8 0.43 -0.15 1.1 1.04
4 - 1.24*** -0.51 -0.36 0.35 -0.49 0.75 0.75
5 -0.87* -0.93 -0.03 0.87 1.93** 2.8 2.99
spread 0.72 1.36 1.32 1.33 2.85
t-val 1.62 2.24 1.99 2.36 3.38
Subsample based on large funds
1 -1.01* -2.36*** -2 74*** .-2.37** -1.71 -0.7 -0.55
2 -0.56 -1.08 -1.6** -1.38 -0.83 -0.28 -0.21
3 - 1.74*** -1.01 -1 78*** -1.43 -1.99 -0.25 -0.17
4 - 1.46*** -1.33** 0.52 -0.68 -1.03 0.42 0.3
5 - 1.74*** -0.2 -0.87 0.19 0.33 2.06 1.54
spread -0.73 2.16 1.87 2.56 2.03
t-val -1.26 2.21 2.02 2.22 1.3
Subsample based on small funds
1 -0.87 -0.84 -0.18 -0.56 1.52 2.39 1.57
2 -1.57* -0.6 0.36 1.37 0.88 2.45 1.47
3 0.41 -0.46 0.34 1.12 1.62 1.21 0.67
4 -0.85 1.7* 0.2 1.27 0.02 0.87 0.69
5 0.4 0.83 0.68 2.66** 1.62 1.22 0.81
spread 1.26 1.68 0.86 3.22 0.09
t-val 1.26 1.54 0.9 2.72 0.06
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selectivity 28.223 -25.387 61.865 21.420 -30.938 48.842
(0.911) (-0.617) (1.738) (0.688) (-0.750) (1.361)
selectivity * ta (2) -14.666 3.813 -16.693 -14.750 6.110 -17.408
(-0.675) (0.076) (-0.383) (-0.680) (0.122) (-0.396)
selectivity * ta(3) -22.113 -17.962 -40.051 -20.730 -14.296 -37.944
(-0.883) (-0.396) (-1.127) (-0.825) (-0.314) (-1.040)
selectivity * ta(4) -40.179 -40.538 -56.033 -39.764 -37.032 -58.790
(-1.645) (-0.898) (-1.386) (-1.623) (-0.817) (-1.451)
selectivity * ta(5) 32.265 48.579 -8.486 32.838 50.048 -6.479
(1.403) (1.002) (-0.217) (1.423) (1.032) (-0.164)
ta(2) 6.522 2.968 7.259 6.394 2.387 7.010
(1.647) (0.483) (1.188) (1.614) (0.390) (1.137)
ta(3) 9.844 5.113 11.543 9.487 4.425 10.666
(2.191) (0.851) (1.951) (2.111) (0.735) (1.795)
ta (4) 11.603 12.344 10.733 11.364 11.614 10.912
(2.492) (1.997) (1.551) (2.440) (1.884) (1.578)
ta(5) 6.392 7.362 11.055 6.085 6.678 10.355
(1.334) (1.058) (1.618) (1.271) (0.958) (1.507)
flow 461.294 572.772 400.795 470.166 580.901 410.417
(9.504) (4.335) (10.709) (9.515) (4.403) (10.677)
alpha 36 (t) 2.263 1.948 4.301 2.614 2.105 5.107
(1.110) (0.759) (2.100) (1.274) (0.820) (2.464)
)atnalog -1.482 -1.587 0.548 -0.795 -1.097 3.560
(-2.179) (-1.439) (0.266) (-1.186) (-0.981) (1.698)
b 12.317 10.745 12.468 11.885 10.847 11.467
(0.442) (0.309) (0.448) (0.427) (0.312) (0.413)
s 29.816 22.453 34.189 28.199 21.118 33.173
(1.868) (1.322) (2.269) (1.759) (1.241) (2.190)
h 18.043 24.660 9.186 19.330 26.179 10.178
(0.982) (1.014) (0.567) (1.043) (1.072) (0.619)
u 13.902 6.742 17.852 13.615 6.099 17.917
(0.343) (0.131) (0.494) (0.335) (0.119) (0.493)
Observations 350,435 69,980 70,197 350,435 69,980 70,197
Adjusted R2 0.725 0.764 0.699 0.727 0.765 0.700
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T able 2.14. Flow regression
Flow
(1) (2) (3)








alpha36(t) 0.01 0.01 0.01
(39.20) (38.45) (39.89)
expense - 0.20 -0.004 -0.14
(-3.08) (-0.03) (-2.71)
b - 0.002 -0.004 - 0.002
(-1.17) ( - 1.68) (-0.89)
s - 0.001 - 0.001 - 0.001
( - 1.02) (-0.38) (-0.56)
h 0.01 0.02 0.01
(3.64) (9.32) (3.41)
u 0.01 0.02 0.01
(5.04) (9.66) (5.31)











T able 2.15. Robustness test: investment direction and turnover ratio
(1)
grossR  











ta (2) * turnover 2.90
(0.80)
ta (3) * turnover 1.06
(0.30)
ta (4) * turnover 6.88
(2.24)





















T a b le  2.16. Robustness test: double sorting on investment direction and turnover ratio 
based on grossR
Turnover
spread t-valta 1 2 3 4 5
Full sample based on all funds
1 0.62 0.75 0.97** 0.78** 1.28** 0.65 0.92
2 1.29*** 1.2*** 1.51*** 1.23*** 0.84* -0.45 -0.61
3 1.35*** 1.15*** 0.63 1.54*** 0.92* -0.43 -0.63
4 0.75 0.75* 1.36*** 1.44*** 1.48*** 0.73 0.97
5 0.81* -0.09 0.94** 1.67*** 2.31*** 1.5 2.12
spread 0.19 -0.84 -0.03 0.9 1.04
t-val 0.37 -1.73 -0.04 1.69 1.63
Subsample based on large funds
1 1.7*** 0.55 1.39** -0.15 -0.9 -2.59 -2.43
2 1.49* 2.01*** 1 7*** 0.81 0.12 -1.37 -1.08
3 0.58 1.62** 1.21** 2.6*** 0.68 0.1 0.08
4 0.99 -0.08 1 74*** 2.63*** 0.77 -0.22 -0.22
5 1.72*** 0.91 1.9** 2.46*** 2.18*** 0.46 0.44
spread 0.03 0.36 0.51 2.62 3.08
t-val 0.04 0.4 0.59 2.58 2.75
Subsample based on small funds
1 1.31* 0.06 1.1 -0.31 1.04 -0.26 -0.19
2 1.17 1.87** 1.66* 0.36 5.13*** 3.96 3.44
3 1.8** 1.25 0.67 1.83** -0.19 -1.98 -1.38
4 1.6* 1.45 1.28 2.28*** -0.33 -1.93 -1.32
5 1.96** 0.31 2.4** 2.46*** 1.44 -0.52 -0.37
spread 0.65 0.25 1.3 2.77 0.4
t-val 0.62 0.22 1.08 1.97 0.28
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